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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS' USE OF PUBLIC
SCHOOL FACILITIES AFTER SCHOOL HOURS HELD CONSTITUTIONAL BY
NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT-In 1962, the East Brunswick Board of
Education initiated a program of renting public school facilities to nonprofit
community groups for use after school hours. The program was open to both
secular and religious organizations. I Groups participating in the program had
to reapply each year, with no limitation on the number of reapplications.
2
The rent paid by each organization was slightly less than the actual costs
incurred by the board of education. 3 During the 1970's, three religious groups
participated in the rental program. Each of these groups used the school
facilities for several years while awaiting the completion of their own build-
ings. 4 The religious groups conducted both social and religious activities in
the school, some of which required storage of religious artifacts on school
property.5
In 1974, Abraham Resnick brought suit in the New Jersey Superior Court to
enjoin the use of the public school facilities by these religious groups. Resnick
alleged that this interaction between church and state violated the establish-
ment clause of the first amendment. 6 The trial court found the program
unconstitutional 7 and the appellate division affirmed. 8 The New Jersey Su-
preme Court reversed, holding that if the rent paid by the religious groups
accurately reflected the total cost incurred by the board of education, the
1. Resnick v. East Brunswick Township Bd. of Educ., 77 N.J. 88, 93, 389 A.2d 944, 946
(1978).
2. Id. at 94, 389 A.2d at 947.
3. The rent charged the participants was sufficient to pay for a substantial portion of
maintenance costs, but fell short of the amounts expended for utilities and administration of the
program. Id. at 94-96, 389 A.2d at 947-48.
4. The three participants were the East Brunswick Baptist Church, the Nativity Evangelical
Lutheran Church, and the Reformed Temple of East Brunswick. The Baptist Church began
renting public school facilities in 1969, the Lutheran Church in 1968, and the Reformed Temple
in 1973. Id. at 94-95, 389 A.2d at 947.
5. The religious artifacts included a cross, a pulpit, Bibles, hymnals, and religious instruc-
tional materials. Id.
6. The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. Const. amend. I. The amendment
contains both the establishment and the free exercise clauses, which are referred to collectively as
the religion clauses.
Resnick also alleged violations of the New Jersey Constitution, N.J. Const. art. 1, 3-4, and
of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18A:20-34 (West 1968). See note 84 supra and accompanying text. It should
be noted that Resnick brought suit as a taxpayer. Resnick v. East Brunswick Township Bd. of
Educ., 135 N.J. Super. 257, 259, 343 A.2d 127, 128 (Ch. Div. 1975), aff'd per curiam, 144 N.J.
Super. 474, 366 A.2d 345 (App. Div. 1976), rev'd, 77 N.J. 88, 389 A.2d 944 (1978). The right of a
taxpayer to challenge a state appropriation was recognized by the United States Supreme Court In
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486-(1923).
7. Resnick v. East Brunswick Township Bd. of Educ., 135 N.J. Super. 257, 343 A.2d 127
(Ch. Div. 1975).
8. Resnick v. East Brunswick Township Bd. of Educ., 144 N.J. Super. 474, 366 A.2d 34S
(App. Div. 1976).
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program would not violate the establishment clause. 9 The majority applied
the three-part test established by the United States Supreme Court in dealing
with aid to sectarian schools. The three-part test requires that a government
aid program have a secular purpose, a primary effect that neither advances
nor inhibits religion, and that it avoid excessive entanglement with religion.)0
The dissent by Justice Clifford found that the rental program violated the
second and third parts of the three-part test." Resnick v. East Brunswick
Township Board of Education, 77 N.J. 88, 389 A.2d 944 (1978).
The United States Supreme Court has held that the religion clauses of the
first amendment require the state to adopt a position of benevolent neutrality
ip church-state relations. 12 Within the dictates of the first amendment,
however, there is an area of permissible interaction between church and
state. 13 The problem confronting the Court has been the formulation of
guidelines that outline the scope of permissible state involvement in church
affairs. The majority of litigation under the establishment clause has arisen
out of large scale government programs that provide aid to sectarian
schools. 4 In these cases, the three-part test has been rigorously applied and
most of the programs have been held to violate the establishment clause."5
The program attacked in Resnick is unlike those which the Court has dealt
with in the past. The East Brunswick program did not provide financial aid
to sectarian schools; no direct grants or periodic appropriations of large sums
of money were involved. The decision is significant, therefore, because it gave
9. Resnick v. East Brunswick Township Bd. of Educ., 77 N.J. 88, 103, 389 A.2d 944, 951
(1978).
10. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 358 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756, 772-73 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). For a discussion of
the development and interpretation of the three-part test, see Note, Establishment Clause
Analysis of Legislative and Administrative Aid to Religion, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 1175, 1178-90
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Aid to Religion].
11. Resnick v. East Brunswick Township Bd. of Educ., 77 N.J. 88, 129-35, 389 A.2d 944,
964-67 (1978) (Clifford, J., dissenting). The second dissent by Judge Conford did not discuss the
three-part test. Judge Conford found that the use of public school facilities by religious groups fell
within the holding of McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948), discussed at notes
23-25 infra and accompanying text, and saw no reason to apply the three-part test. 77 N.J. at
137-38, 389 A.2d at 968-69 (Conford, J., dissenting).
12. E.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970). The concept of neutrality is not
susceptible to easy definition. There are two schools of thought concerning what constitutes
neutrality in church-state relations. The first, the strict neutrality school, seeks to maximize the
separation of church from state in order to achieve neutrality. The second, the political neutrality
school, emphasizes a proportional relationship between church and state; as government expands,
the degree of permissible church-state interaction should expand. See Gianella, Religious Liberty,
Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development: Part II, The Nonestablishment Principle, 81
Harv. L. Rev. 513, 514-15 (1968). The Supreme Court decisions do not fit precisely into either
school, though they tend toward a strict neutrality interpretation. See L. Tribe, American
Constitutional Law 820-22 (1978).
13. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
14. See notes 46-47 infra and accompanying text.
15. See notes 51-55, 65-67 infra and accompanying text.
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the New Jersey Supreme Court an opportunity to apply the three-part test to
a different factual setting.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE THREE-PART TEST
A. The Early Cases
The modern interpretation of the establishment clause began with Everson
v. Board of Education.16 Everson involved the expenditure of public funds to
provide transportation for students in Catholic schools. The Court held that
the program did not violate the establishment clause because it was a safety
measure, analogous to police and fire protection. 17 The decision was sig-
nificant not for what it held, but for the dictum it contained. Specifically, the
Court stated that nonpreferential aid to religious institutions would violate the
first amendment. 18 The majority decided that it was the intent of the
founding fathers "to erect 'a wall of separation between church and State.' , 9
Little more than one year after Everson, the Court decided McCollum v.
Board of Education.20 In McCollum, the board of education permitted
representatives of the Jewish, Catholic, and Protestant faiths to use public
school facilities for religious instruction. The public school students were free
to pursue alternative secular studies. 2' The Court held that the program was
unconstitutional because it directly conferred benefits upon the participating
16. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Prior to Everson, the Court had not attempted to provide an all
inclusive definition of the requirements of the establishment clause, though it did deal with issues
arising under the religion clauses of the Constitution. See Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50
(1908); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878);
Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815). These cases offer no systematic approach to the
application of the establishment clause. Thomas Cooley e:.pressed the 19th century interpretation
of the establishment clause: "By establishment of Religion is meant the setting up or recognition
of a state church or at least the conferring upon one church of special favors and advantages
which are denied to others." T. Cooley, General Principles of Constitutional Law 235 (1891),
quoted in C. Antieau, A. Downey & E. Roberts, Freedom From Federal Establishment: The
Formation and Early History of the First Amendment Religion Clauses 362 (1963).
17. 330 U.S. at 17.
18. Id. at 15. The Court believed that its interpretation of the establishment clause was
justified by the history of the period in which the clause was drafted and ratified. In presenting
the history of the clause, Justice Black, writing for the majority, relied heavily upon the writings
of James Madison and Thomas Jefferson to determine the intent of the first Congress. Id. at
11-13. Justice Black's historiography was criticized in J. Brady, Confusion Twice Confounded
(1955). Brady argued that Justice Black failed to give proper weight to the debates of the first
Congress, id. at 9-12, and that he misinterpreted the notions of Madison and Jefferson concerning
church-state affairs. Id. at 59.
19. 330 U.S. at 16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)). The
dissenting opinions of Justices Jackson and Rutledge argued that the establishment clause
imposed greater restrictions on church-state interaction than those recognized by the majority.
Justice Jackson reasoned that the establishment clause banned all aid that benefitted sectarian
education. Id. at 24 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Justice Rutledge stated that the express language of
the first amendment indicated the intent of the founding fathers to go beyond a ban on the
creation of a national church to prohibit "every form of public aid or support for religion." Id. at
32 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
20. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
21. Id. at 207-09.
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religious organizations. 2 2 In so holding, the Court implemented the dictum of
Everson.
2 3
Everson and McCollum provide some guidance as to the type of programs
that will satisfy the requirements of the establishment clause. Initially, the
state may not establish a national religion or discriminate in favor of a
particular religious organization. Moreover, the state may not impose a tax
for the purpose of directly subsidizing religious activities, or prefer religious
over secular interests.2 4 Everson and McCollum require that the state be
neutral in its dealings with sectarian organizations. Government aid programs
should neither advance nor hinder the interests of religious groups .-
B. The Two-Part Test
School District v. Schempp26 represented a shift away from the ad hoc
adjudication previously employed by the Court toward the development of
definite guidelines for determining the validity of government programs under
the establishment clause. Prior to Schempp, the Court had examined each
individual program in light of the broad philosophical underpinnings of the
religion clauses of the first amendment.27 In Schenmpp, however, the Court set
22. Id. at 209-10. The majority opinion was strongly attacked by Justice Reed. He argued
that the establishment clause had not been intended to prohibit nonpreferential aid to religious
sects. Justice Reed contended that religion was an integral part of American culture at the time of
the adoption of the first amendment and that the record of the first Congress did not support the
assertion that the establishment clause was intended to bring about a wall of separation between
church and state. Id. at 244-46 (Reed, J., dissenting). For an evaluation of Justice Reed's dissent,
see F. O'Brien, Justice Reed and the First Amendment 147-53 (1958).
23. 333 U.S. at 211. McCollum was later distinguished in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306
(1952). In Zorach, children were released from public school in order to attend religious services
and receive religious instruction in private facilities. The Court held that the program did not
violate the establishment clause. The Court reasoned that accommodation of religion was
permissible when the government action did not require or create concert, union, or dependency
between church and state. Id. at 312-14. Subsequent decisions dealing with religious activity in
public schools, however, have limited the accommodationalist language of the Zorach Court. In
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), the Court invalidated the daily reading of a government-
prepared prayer in public schools. Similarly, in School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), the
Court ruled that daily Bible reading in public school was unconstitutional. The Court has
indicated that when there is a close connection between religion and the public schools, the
ensuing relationship would be viewed as a prohibited concert of action rather than an accommo-
dation of religion. See J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, Handbook on Constitutional Law 870
(1978).
24. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. at 15-16; see McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333
U.S. at 210.
25. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. at 210; Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. at
18; see Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 672 (1970); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314
(1952).
26. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
27. Four important rulings preceded Schempp: Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Zorach
v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). In these decisions the Court did not develop specific guidelines
with which to determine the validity of a program under the establishment clause. In Eve'son,
the decision turned upon the classification of the program as a general welfare measure. Id. at
16-17. McCollum relied upon the dicta in Everson, and the principle that the power of the state
1979]
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forth a two-part test in its analysis of a program permitting public school
teachers to read ten verses of the Bible to their students each day. 28 The
two-part test provides that a valid program must have "a secuiar legislative
purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion." 29
The Court held that the Bible reading program was unconstitutional. It
declined to decide whether Bible reading was devoid of a secular purpose
and, instead, held that the program's primary effect was the advancement of
religion. 30
The two-part test was next applied in Board of Education v. Allen. 31 In
Allen, the Court upheld a state program that provided secular textbooks to
students attending sectarian schools. The Court found that the program had a
secular purpose, the improvement of educational standards in the state.3 2 It
based its finding upon the premise that sectarian schools serve religious and
secular functions, each of which is distinct from the other. The Court also
found that the primary effect was not to advance or hinder religion.3 3 In so
doing, the Allen Court chose to focus upon the immediate recipients of the
benefits rather than the sectarian institutions that ultimately benefitted from
the program. 34 The Court reasoned that because the aid was conferred upon
the students and their parents, the primary effect was to benefit those
recipients and not the sectarian schools in which the textbooks were used. 3"
should not be directly associated with the inculcation of religious values. 333 U.S. at 216, 212.
Zorach relied upon the concept of accommodation to justify the release time program. 343 U.S. at
315. Finally, Engel was based on the premise that the reading of government-prepared prayer In
public schools created the appearance of sponsorship of religion because it placed the power and
prestige of the government behind religious exercises. 370 U.S. at 431.
28. 374 U.S. at 205. The problem presented in Schernpp was similar to that presented In
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), in which the Court struck down the nondenominational
"Regents' prayer" of New York. The ruling in Engel was limited to state-composed prayers, id. at
425, leaving the question of Bible readings open until Schempp.
29. 374 U.S. at 222. Although the requirements of the two-part test and the subsequently
developed three-part test offer, a greater opportunity for constancy of evaluation in adjudicating
establishment clause issues than does the broad philosophical approach, their utility should not be
overemphasized. Each part of the test raises its own definitional and substantive issues, and
resolution of these issues is influenced by policy considerations that arise from the particular facts
of each case. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 263 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring).
30. 374 U.S. at 223-24. The Court did distinguish between Bible reading as practiced In
Schempp and use of the Bible for instruction in literature or history. Id. at 224-25. One
commentator has argued that the Court held that the Bible reading program failed the secular
purpose requirement of the test. See Aid to Religion, supra note 10, at 1179.
31. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
32. Id. at 243.
33. Id. at 244. The Court found the textbook loan program analogous to the transportation
program in Everson, reasoning that although indirect aid made attendance at sectarian schools
more likely, the primary effect of the program was not the advancement of religion. Id. at 243-44;
see Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. at 17-18. The Allen Court placed the burden upon the
plaintiffs to show lack of a secular primary effect. 392 U.S. at 243-44. In Committee for Pub.
Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 779 (1973), the Court shifted the burden to the defendant to
show that the program did have a secular primary effect. See note 68 infra and accompanying
text.
34. 392 U.S. at 245. But see Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 363 (1975), discussed at notes
71-77 infra and accompanying text.
35. 392 U.S. at 248.
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With Allen, the Supreme Court examined a relatively new area
under the establishment clause, that is, aid to sectarian schools.36 The
issues arising from this type of state program are qualitatively different from
those presented in prior cases. The earlier cases necessitated a determination
of the proper relationship between the public schools and religious exercises
such as religious instruction and prayer. The Court had to decide to what
degree and in what manner the state may, when creating and operating an
institution such as a public school, accommodate the religious values of the
community served by the institution. 37 The problems presented by aid to
sectarian schools are more complex because they require a determination of
the degree and manner of state participation in the attainment of secular ends
by sectarian institutions. 38 Allen temporarily resolved these problems by
holding aid that indirectly assists secular instruction in sectarian schools
valid under the establishment clause.
The Court reformulated the second part of the two-part test in Walz v. Tax
Commission.39 There, a taxpayer challenged the validity of the tax-exempt
status of church-owned property.40 Resolution of this issue presented the
Court with two significant problems. First, the tax exemption for church
property dated back to colonial times and existed in all fifty states.4 1 Second,
the taxation of church property would create the potential for state intrusion
into religious affairs because proceedings could be brought against church
property for failure to pay taxes.42 In response to these concerns the Court
36. With the exception of Everson, the cases prior to Alles dealt with the relationship
between religious exercises and public education. See notes 21, 28 supra and accompanying text.
37. See notes 20-30 supra and accompanying text. One of the problems underlying the
question of accommodation is the potential clash between the religion clauses. The Court has
recognized that either clause, if taken to its logical extreme, would conflict with the other. Walz
v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970).
Professor Tribe suggests that there are three types of accommodation: required, permissible,
and forbidden accommodation. Required accommodation arises when a failure to accommodate a
person's religious beliefs would violate the free exercise clause by penalizing or preventing the
exercise of those beliefs. Permissible accommodation occurs when a government institution
modifies its practices to accommodate the beliefs of those affected by its operations without
endorsing those beliefs. Forbidden accommodation occurs when the modification implemented by
the government institution creates the appearance of sponsorship of religion. L. Tribe, supra note
12, at 819-25.
38. See generally L. Tribe, supra note 12, at 839-46; Aid to Religion, supra note 10, at
1182-87.
39. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
40. Id. at 667. The plaintiff contended that New York City's grant of a tax exemption for
church-owned property constituted an indirect contribution of his taxes to religious organizations.
Id.
41. Id. at 676-77. The Court stated that generally the constitutionality of a government action
could not be based on the performance of the action over an extended period of time.
Nevertheless, the Court conceded that the duration and universality of the practice created a
strong presumption that it was valid. Id. at 678. The Court rejected the plaintiff's argument that
because the government has the power to tax property, the failure to tax church-owned property
is sponsorship of religion, reasoning that the active transfer of funds rather than the granting of a
tax exemption created the danger of sponsorship of religion. Id. at 675. See generally Gianella,
supra note 12, at 548-49.
42. 397 U.S. at 674.
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altered the second part of the test. The Court did not question whether the
primary effect of the tax exemption was the advancement of religion, but
whether the primary effect was excessive entanglement with religion. 4 3 Under
this analysis, the Walz Court found that the tax exemption was constitutionally
valid because its effect was to avoid entanglement with religion.44 Despite the
accommodationalist tones of the Walz holding, however, the decision warned
that subsidies and grants to religious institutions would create the danger of
excessive entanglement.45
C. The Three-Part Test
The principal three-part test cases all deal with statutory schemes intended
to provide financial aid to sectarian schools, either directly to the institution4
6
or indirectly to students or their parents. 47 In Lemon v. Kurtzman,4" the
Court interpreted its holding in Walz as creating a three-part test, with the
third requirement being that government programs must not foster excessive
entanglement with religion. 49 In Lemon, taxpayers challenged the constitu-
tionality of two state statutes, one authorizing the government to subsidize the
salaries of teachers of secular subjects in sectarian schools and the other
authorizing government reimbursement of sectarian schools for expenditures
in providing secular courses.50 The Court held that these statutes fostered
excessive entanglement with religion and, therefore, violated the establish-
ment clause. 51 The Court set forth three factors to be considered in evaluating
a program under the excessive entanglement requirement: the religious
43. Id. at 674-75.
44. Id. at 675-76.
45. Id.
46. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (loan of educational materials to sectarian
schools); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (grants for repair of sectarian
school facilities); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (federal construction grants to
religiously affiliated colleges); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (teacher salary subsidies
and reimbursements for the cost of secular instruction).
47. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (advanced and remedial instruction by govern-
ment teachers for students in sectarian schools); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756 (1973) (tuition reimbursements and tax deductions for parents of students attending sectarian
schools).
48. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
49. Id. at 612-13. The addition of the excessive entanglement inquiry has been criticized by
those who believe that it both intrudes into free exercise questions and duplicates the primary
effect analysis. See, e.g., Aid to Religion, supra note 10, at 1186-87. Professor Tribe contends,
however, that the prohibition against excessive entanglement more accurately reflects the
fundamental concept of separation of church and state than the other two parts of the test. L.
Tribe, supra note 12, at 865-66.
50. 403 U.S. at 607-11.
51. Id. at 614. The Court noted that the excessive entanglement requirement was intended
"to confine rather than enlarge the area of permissible state involvement with religious institu-
tions by calling for close scrutiny of the degree of entanglement involved in the relationship." Id. at
614. The Court also held that the programs had a secular purpose, the improvement of secular
education, but refused to rule on their primary effect because it was able to resolve the question
of constitutionality under the excessive entanglement analysis. Id. at 613; see J. Nowak, R.
Rotunda & J. Young, Handbook on Constitutional Law 854 (1978); Aid to Religion, supra note
10, at 1187.
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characteristics of the beneficiary institutions;5 2 the nature of the aid given by
the state; and the relationship between the government and the beneficiaries
of the program.5 3 The Court stated that if the beneficiary institution is per-
meated with religion, and the aid conferred is subject to extensive state
supervision and control, the resulting relationship gives rise to excessive
entanglement.5 4 Conversely, if the recipient institution is permeated with
religion, but the aid conferred consists of financial subsidies accompanied by
little or no state supervision, the resulting relationship gives rise to the
appearance of sponsorship because the influence and power of the government
are identified with the active inculcation of religious beliefs. s s The Court's
reasoning indicates that programs of direct aid to sectarian schools are
unlikely to pass the requirements of the three-part test because they either
engender excessive entanglement with religion or create the appearance of
sponsorship.56
The Lemon Court also distinguished between two types of excessive
entanglement-administrative entanglement and political entanglement.5 7
The existence of administrative entanglement turns upofi the amount of
government supervision of the religious beneficiaries required under the
program. 53 The existence of political entanglement rests upon the possibility
that religious groups may exert pressure upon elected officials to insure the
continuance of government aid programs.5 9 For example, the Court stated
52. The sectarian beneficiaries of a government aid program can be divided into three
categories based upon their religious characteristics: those that serve a purely religious function;
those that are dominated by religious characteristics, but also perform secular functions; and
those that are affiliated with religious organizations, but perform predominantly secular func-
tions. See Aid to Religion, supra note 10, at 1182.
53. 403 U.S. at 615. The first two factors, the character of the recipients and the nature of the
aid, closely parallel the areas of examination under the primary effect portion of the test. See
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 365-66 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 779-81 (1973); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973).
54. 403 U.S. at 619-20. The concern over the intrusion of government into religious affairs is
indicative of the policy considerations that underlie the free exercise clause. See J. Nowak,
R. Rotunda & J. Young, Handbook on Constitutional Law 871 (1978). This raises the problem of
a program being struck down as violative of the establishment clause because it impinges on the
free exercise of religion, when the subjects of the surveillance have not complained of the
intrusion into their internal affairs.
55. 403 U.S. at 616-17. The Court held that the state must prove to a degree of certainty that
subsidized teachers do not promote religion. In Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), the Court
stated: "When the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a
particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to
the prevailing officially approved religion is plain." Id. at 431. A program lacking adequate
supervision could fail under either the excessive entanglement or primary effect requirements of
the three-part test. A court which reasons that the appearance of sponsorship results in excessive
entanglement may similarly reason that such a program advances religion. See, e.g., Committee
for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 775-77 (1973).
56. See 403 U.S. at 668 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also Meek
v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 386 (1975); Aid to Religion, supra note 10, at 1187 n.80.
57. 403 U.S. at 615, 622.
58. Id. at 619.
59. Id. at 622. The Court stated that "political divisions along religious lines was one of the
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that a program calling for annual appropriation accompanied by "the likeli-
hood of larger . .. demands as costs and populations grow," would foster
excessive political entanglement.
60
Finally, the Lemon Court imposed a high burden of proof upon the party
defending the validity of the school aid program. The Court held that the
defendant must demonstrate to a degree of certainty that the program did not
create the possibility of excessive entanglement. 61 The position taken by the
Lemon Court represented a shift away from the approach taken in Allen. The
Allen Court refused to find a program invalid under the establishment clause
absent a positive showing by the challenging party of a primary effect which
advances religion.
6 2
Whereas Lemon more fully explained excessive entanglement, Committee
for Public Education v. Nyquist 63 addressed the primary effect requirement of
the three-part test. In Nyquist, the Court dealt with three programs that
provided aid to sectarian schools. The first included direct money grants to
private schools that were serving predominantly low income families. The
second provided for reimbursement of tuition to low income families with
children attending private schools. The third granted a tax deduction to
families with children attending private schools who did not qualify for
tuition reimbursement. 64 The Court held that all three programs violated the
establishment clause because their primary effect was the advancement of
religion. 6- The Court stated that to satisfy the primary effect requirement the
principal evils against which the First Amendment was intended to protect." Id; see Freund,
Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1680, 1692 (1969). A distinction must be
drawn between the legitimate efforts of religious groups to advocate their positions on public
issues, Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 670, and the use of the political process by such groups
to acquire privileges and economic advantages for themselves. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at
623. Only a potential for the latter use of political power falls within the prohibition of political
entanglement. See L. Tribe, supra note 12, at 867.
60. 403 U.S. at 623. In Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971), decided the same day as
Lemon, the Court upheld the validity of federal construction grants to sectarian colleges. The
Court distinguished Tilton from Lemon on three grounds. First, the sectarian and secular
functions of the colleges were more readily divisible. Id. at 686-87. Second, the nature of the aid
given was neutral; it did not tend to identify the government with the promotion of religious
tenets. Id. at 687-88. Third, the program did not create a long and continuing relationship
between church and state. Id. at 688. Hence, the aid program was declared constitutional, with
the exception of a provision in the statute that restricted the use of the buildings to secular
purposes for only twenty years. Id. at 689; see J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, Handbook on
Constitutional Law 858-60 (1978); Aid to Religion, sujra note 10, at 1182-86.
61. 403 U.S. at 619. In effect, the Court has imposed a presumption of excessive entangle-
ment for cases in which the government program is carried out in sectarian schools. This
presumption is contrary to the ordinary situation in which the burden of proof is on the plaintiff
to prove the unconstitutionality of a challenged program. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349,
392 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
62. 392 U.S. at 248. The requirement of certainty imposed in Lemon also differs from the
method of analysis used in Walz. In Walz, the Court emphasized the historical lack of
entanglement resulting from a tax exemption, Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 678-88, rather
than its potential for entanglement.
63. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
64. Id. at 762-67.
65. Id. at 774, 780, 791.
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class of beneficiaries created by the program must be sufficiently broad,
encompassing a significant number of nonsectarian beneficiaries, 66 and the
direct and immediate effect of the program must not be the advancement of
religion. 67 The Court failed, however, to indicate how these two components
of the primary effect requirement would interact with each other. The Court
also extended the certainty requirement, which had been first implemented in
the excessive entanglement analysis in Lemon, to the primary effect part of
the test. The defendant, therefore, must prove to a degree of certainty that the
primary effect of the challenged program cannot be the advancement of
religion .68
The ruling in Nyquist limited the Court's earlier holding in Allen. The Allen
Court held that programs in which the fina.ncial benefit runs to parents and
students rather than directly to religious institutions did not have the primary
effect of advancing religion. 69 The Nyquist Court, however, struck down
programs that provided financial aid and tax deductiotis to families with
children attending private schools. 7 0
66. Id. at 782 n.38. The Court distinguished the tuition reimbursement plan in ,Vyquist from
the programs in Allen, Everson, and Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971). The Court pointed
out that the class of beneficiaries in Tilton included all colleges and universities, and the classes in
Allen and Everson included all schoolchildren. The Nyquist program, however, extended its
benefits to a class comprised primarily of parents of children attending sectarian schools. 413 U.S.
at 794. The Court further distinguished the tax deductions in Nyquist from the tax exemptions in
Walz on the ground that the Walz tax exemptions applied to all nonprofit organizations, whereas
most individuals who qualified for the Nyquist deductions did so because of their relationship
with sectarian schools. Id. at 782 n.38.
67. 413 U.S. at 783 n.39. Although the Nyquist Court described the effort to determine the
primary effect of a program as "metaphysical", id. at 782 n.39, its notion of direct and immediate
effect is equally abstract. Aid to Religion, supra note 10, at 1182. The Court has indicated that
two factors are to be considered in the determination of direct effect: the religious character of the
beneficiaries and the severability of the aid given from the religious functions of the school.
Applying the components of the direct and immediate effect analysis, the Nyquist Court held that
the first program, which gave direct money grants to sectarian schools for the repair of the school
buildings, had the direct effect of advancing religion. The Court reasoned that when monetary
grants are coupled with the pervasive religious character of the sectarian schools, the aid
conferred is not separable from the religious functions of the school, and the direct effect of the
program is to contribute to the religious mission of the schools. 413 U.S. at 779-80. In examining
the second and third programs, which conferred tuition reimbursements and tax deductions on
parents of children attending sectarian schools, the Court reasoned that because the schools were
the ultimate beneficiaries under such programs, the effect of these two plans would have to be
evaluated in light of the religious characteristics of these schools coupled with the nature of the
programs. The Court found that because of the religious permeation in the schools, and the
inability to separate the tuition funds used for secular education from those used for religious
instruction, the direct effect of these programs was to advance religion. Id. at 783-91.
68. 413 U.S. at 779.
69. 392 U.S. at 244-45.
70. 413 U.S. at 780, 794. In addition to limiting Allen, the ruling in Nyquist may limit the
Court's holding in Wa/z. The Walz Court implied that there is no connection between a state's
refusal to exercise its taxing power and the establishment of religion. See 397 U.S. at 675. In
Nyquist, however, the Court held that such a refusal had the primary effect of advancing
religion. 413 U.S. at 793-94. There are several possible reasons for the Court's contrasting
reasoning in Walz and Nyquist, most significant of which is that the Wa/L Court scrutinized the
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The Court continued its strict application of the three-part test in Meek v.
Pittenger.71 In Meek, the Court dealt with a taxpayer challenge to two school
aid programs. One provided for loaning educational materials, including
textbooks, to sectarian schools, and the other authorized the use of
government-employed teachers in sectarian schools to provide remedial train-
ing and advanced instruction in sectarian schools. 7 2 The Court held that state
loans of instructional materials other than textbooks to sectarian schools
violated the establishment clause, reasoning that such loan programs had the
direct and immediate effect of advancing religion. It further indicated
that the determination of the direct and immediate effect of a program would
be influenced by the nature of the aid given and the religious characteristics of
the sectarian beneficiaries.7 3 The Court distinguished the textbook loan from
the remainder of the program because, as a result of their fixed secular
content, textbooks could not be used for religious education and were not
affected by the religious characteristics of the sectarian schools.
74
The Court applied the excessive entanglement portion of the test to strike
down the other aid program. It found that the amount of supervision
necessary to avoid the appearance of sponsorship engendered by the presence
of government employees in a religious setting created an impermissible
administrative entanglement. 7 - The Court further reasoned that the annual
appropriations necessary to operate the second program created excessive
political entanglement 76 and that the defendant had failed to show to a
degree of certainty that the program did not contain the potential for excessive
administrative or political entanglements. 77
The following conclusions can be drawn from the development of the
three-part test. Initially, the cases demonstrate that the secular purpose
component requires the least amount of justification by the party defending a
program under the two-part test, while the Nyquist Court examined it under the three-part test.
Furthermore, tax exemptions for church-owned property can be distinguished from tax deduc-
tions for parents with children attending sectarian schools. It can be argued that the primary
effect of the tax exemption is to further the separation of church and state, rather than to advance
religion. On the other hand, the tax deduction granted to parents with children attending
sectarian schools does not further the separation of church and state, and results in an Indirect
subsidy of sectarian schools. See Aid to Religion, supra note 10, at 1186.
71. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
72. Id. at 351-53. One program included loaning books, audiovisual equipment, maps and
charts to sectarian schools. Id. at 353-55. The other program included "counseling, testing,
psychological services, speech and hearing therapy." Id. at 353.
73. 421 U.S. at 366. The reasoning in Meek seriously undermines the rationale behind Allen.
Whereas Allen held that the sectarian and secular functions of sectarian schools are sufficiently
divisible to permit indirect aid that benefits the secular functions of these schools, 392 U.S. at
245, the Meek ruling suggested that when the beneficiar is dominated by religious characteris-
tics, the secular aid conferred upon the sectarian school will be considered unseverable from its
religious functions. See 421 U.S. at 366.
74. 421 U.S. at 359-62. The Court upheld the book loan part of the program based on Its
earlier holding in Allen. Id. at 359.
75. Id. at 370.
76.- Id. at 372.
77. Id. The Court criticized the trial court's reliance on a showing by the proponents of the
program that the second program had not resulted in actual entanglement. Id. at 369.
[Vol. 4 7
1979] RECENT DEVELOPMENT 633
school aid program. The party challenging its validity must demonstrate that
the program was devoid of any secular purpose before a court will find that it
violates the establishment clause. 78 The mere coincidence of secular and
religious purposes will not defeat the program. 79 The primary effect require-
ment, however, sets a far higher standard.80 The Court has indicated that
two factors are relevant to the determination of whether the primary effect of
a program is the advancement of religion. First, the class of beneficiaries must
be sufficiently diverse and must include a large number of secular ben-
eficiaries. Second, the direct and immediate effect of the program cannot be
the advancement of religion.8 1 Finally, the requirement that a program avoid
excessive entanglement with religion also sets a high standard and will be
strictly applied.8 2 The Court looks beyond the absence of actual entanglement
to determine whether the possibility exists that a program will produce
excessive administrative or political entanglement.8 3 The requirement of
certainty, that is, demonstration of the lack of a potential for entanglement,
leaves little chance that a program of financial aid to sectarian institutions will
pass the excessive entanglement portion of the test.84 The Court has identified
two policy considerations that support this strict application of the second and
third parts of the test: the degree to which secular and religious subjects are
inextricably intertwined in sectarian schools and the potential for the self-
perpetuating growth of aid programs for sectarian schools accompanied by
religion-oriented political divisions.85
I. THE IMPLICATIONS OF RESICK
In Resnick v. East Brunswick Township Board of Education, 6 the New
Jersey Supreme Court held that the rental program, as it was modified by the
court, had a secular purpose, a primary effect which did not advance religion,
and did not foster excessive entanglement with religion. 87 The significant
78. See Aid to Religion, supra note 10, at 1178-81. But see Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S.
97, 103 (1968) (state prohibition against teaching evolution lacked secular purpose); School Dist.
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223-24 (1963) (secular purpose of Bible reading program questioned).
79. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1968); see L. Tribe, supra note 12, at 835.
80. The Court requires the party defending the program to prove to a degree of certainty that
its primary effect is not the advancement of religion. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 779.
81. See notes 66-67 supra and accompanying text.
82. See notes 56-57 supra and accompanying text.
83. See notes 61-62 supra and accompanying text.
84. See note 56 supra and accompanying text.
85. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 624.
86. 77 N.J. 88, 389 A.2d 944 (1978).
87. Id. at 109-10, 114, 118, 389 A.2d at 9S4-55, 957, 959. In addition to the first amendment
issues, Resnick raised questions of statutory construction and interpretation of the state constitu-
tion. Id. at 98, 102, 389 A.2d at 949, 951. The statute involved grants authority to local boards
of education to permit the after hours use of public school facilities for educational instruction,
social and civic meetings, entertainment, and as polling places and public libraries. N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 18A:20-34 (West 1968). The court held that worship and religious instruction were
sufficiently similar to these enumerated functions to fall within the authority granted by the
statute. 77 N.J. at 101, 389 A.2d at 950. The New Jersey Constitution prohibits the use of tax
money to support churches and places of worship and preference of one sect over others. N.J.
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aspects of Resnick lie in the court's handling of the primary effect and
excessive entanglement parts of the three-part test.
The Resnick court employed the class of beneficiaries analysis, developed
by the Supreme Court in Nyquist, to determine whether the rental program's
primary effect was the advancement of religion. Under this analysis, if the
class of beneficiaries created by the program is sufficiently diverse, including
within it a large number of secular beneficiaries, its primary effect is to aid the
class as a whole and to advance the common interests of the members of
the class.88 The Resnick court held that the primary effect of the rental
program was to benefit all of the nonprofit community groups that used the
public school facilities. The court reasoned that the benefits conferred upon
the sectarian groups did not have the primary effect of advancing religion.8 9
The Resnick court found the reasoning employed in Meek, that the primary
effect of a program is to be determined by the predominance of religious
characteristics in the recipient institution,9" to be inapplicable in the factual
context of Resnick. 9 1 The New Jersey Supreme Court stated that when a
program does not entail significant expenditures of funds for the benefit of
religious institutions, the religious character of the recipients should not be
determinative in resolving the question of primary effect. 92
The Resnick court did not relate its use of the class of beneficiaries analysis
to the other factor set forth in Nyquist for determining the primary effect of a
government aid program, that is, its direct and immediate effect. 93 It is
possible, however, that when the court decided not to examine the religious
characteristics of the beneficiaries in the rental program, it impliedly rejected
the direct and immediate effect factor because an examination of those
characteristics is part of Nyquist's direct and immediate effect factor.
Justice Clifford, however, found that the primary effect of the program was
the advancement of religion. 94 He rejected the class of beneficiaries analysis,
and chose to examine the direct and immediate effect of the rental program. 95
Justice Clifford believed that the board of education conferred a significant
economic benefit upon the religious organizations by fixing the rental charge
well below the open market rates for comparable space. He also believed that
the program afforded the sectarian groups a forum in which to voice their
beliefs and, therefore, identified the state with the participants' religious
Const. art. 1, 3-4. The court held that the rental program was nonpreferential and could be
altered to comply with the constitutional prohibition against expenditure of tax money for
religious purposes if the rents were adjusted to reflect actual out-of-pocket costs incurred by the
board of education. 77 N.J. at 103-04, 389 A.2d at 951-52.
88. 77 N.J. at 111, 389 A.2d at 955; see L. Tribe, supra note 12, at 845-46.
89. 77 N.J. at 111, 389 A.2d at 955. The court admitted that the program did confer some
benefits on the religious participants. Nevertheless, it reasoned that the diversity of beneficiaries
prevented the primary effect from being the advancement of religion. Id.
90. 421 U.S. at 366.
91. 77 N.J. at 115-16, 389 A.2d at 957-58.
92. Id. at 114, 389 A.2d at 957.
93. See notes 65-68 supra and accompanying text.
94. 77 N.J. at 132-33, 389 A.2d at 966 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 131, 389 A.2d at 965-66 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
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principles.9 6 Based upon these two findings, Justice Clifford concluded that the
direct and immediate effect of the program was the advancement of religion.
The split between the majority and Justice Clifford over the application of
the primary effect requirement stems from the United States Supreme Court's
failure to explain how the class of beneficiaries and the direct and immediate
effect factors relate to each other. The dissent's application of the primary
effect requirement is consistent with the more recent United States Supreme
Court decisions. The majority's comparatively lenient interpretation, how-
ever, is justified by the absence of the policy considerations that prompted the
strict application of the primary effect requirement by the Court. Unlike the
programs examined by the United States Supreme Court, Resnick did not
involve large appropriations for the support of sectarian organizations or
active intrusion by the government into the operations of religious institu-
tions.9 7
The majority might have reached a different result if the rent charged the
religious groups was not modified to reflect the total out-of-pocket cost
expended by the board of education because, without the adjustment, the
state was subsidizing the religious groups.9 8 It is submitted, however, that
Justice Clifford's belief that the adjustment of rental charges must reflect open
market rates is not warranted by the establishment clause. 99 The absence of
actual expenditures for the support of religious exercises is sufficient to ensure
neutrality in church-state relations. The imposition of open market rates on
religious participants, without a similar adjustment in the rates charged the
secular participants, would discriminate against the sectarian organizations
and might conflict with the free exercise clause of the first amendment. 10 0 On
96. Id. at 131, 389 A.2d at 965 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
97. The court stated that in recent United States Supreme Court decisions "there was some
significant effect on the public purse. Conversely, the only conceivable public expense in the East
Brunswick scheme [as modified by the court], is a degree of wear and tear on school properties." Id.
at 115, 389 A.2d at 957. The question of wear and tear relates to both the primary effect and
excessive entanglement requirements of the three-part test. Under the primary effect analysis, the
issue is whether the unreimbursed government expenses incurred as a result of wear and tear to
public facilities because of their use by religious groups constitutes an imilermissible advancement
of religion. The Resnick court held that such expenditures were minimal and, therefore, did not
have the primary effect of advancing religion. Id. at 112, 389 A.2d at 9S6. The dissent argued
that the primary effect analysis requires the courts to examine the benefits conferred upon the
religious participants rather than the cost to government. Id. at 130 n.5, 389 A.2d at 965 n.5
(Clifford, J., dissenting). Under the excessive entanglement analysis, the issue is whether the
expenses incurred as a result of wear and tear are sufficiently significant to raise the possibility of
political entanglement and to justify imposing the certainty requirement. The Resnick court held
that the adjustment of rental rates to reflect actual costs was sufficient to avoid entanglement
problems. Id. at 115, 389 A.2d at 957.
98. See id. at 115, 389 A.2d at 957.
99. In Walz, the Court reasoned that the danger of sponsorship arises from the expenditure of
government funds for the benefit of religious groups, not the failure to maximize the revenue
collected from sectarian sources. 397 U.S. at 675. If this reasoning is applied to Resnick. it can be
argued that the danger that the program violated the establishment clause was cured by the
adjustment of the rates to reflect actual cost. The board of education did not have to charge the
religious groups open market rental rates because it was not necessary to maximize revenues.
100. The free exercise clause commands that a state may not interfere with its citizens'
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the other hand, the majority's modification, although a form of discrimina-
tion, is necessary for the program to meet the requirements of the establish-
ment clause and does not impose a substantial burden on the religious
organizations.
The Resnick court did not directly address the question of whether the
prolonged interaction between the religious participants and the board of
education had the primary effect of advancing religion. Sectarian groups had
participated in the East Brunswick program for as long as seven years. 101 The
Florida Supreme Court discussed the effect of such extended use in Southside
Estates Baptist Church v. Board of Trustees. 10 2 The government program
dealt with in Southside was identical to the East Brunswick program. The
Southside court held that, although the permanent use of public school
facilities would violate the establishment clause, temporary use by sectarian
groups is permissible as long as the program does not discriminate in favor of
any one religious group or require the expenditure of public money.103 The
Florida court stated that a religious group's use of public school facilities for a
prolonged period, and without an immediate intent to construct its own
building, would not be considered temporary and would violate the establish-
ment clause. 104 The majority in Resnick agreed with the reasoning in South-
side, and held that the use of the East Brunswick facilities was permissible
because each religious participant in the rental program had actively sought to
obtain its own place of worship.105 The dissent, however, distinguished the
actions of the defendants in Resnick from the situation presented in South-
side. Justice Clifford reasoned that the use of the public school facilities by the
religious groups had been too prolonged to be construed as temporary. 10 6
The determination of whether sectarian groups' use of public school
facilities is temporary or permanent should depend upon more than the length
of time that they participated in the program. A court should also inquire into
the efforts made by the religious groups to obtain their own facilities, and the
difficulties they encountered in attempting to do so. 10 7 For example, the
majority in Resnick pointed out that all of the religious groups had retained
expression of their religious beliefs. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 669. It also prevents the
state from discriminating against individuals because of those beliefs.. See Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. at 16. An increase in the rent charged the religious groups in the East Brunswick
program to reflect open market rates would impose a serious burden upon their members' ability
to exercise freely their religious beliefs.
101. 77 N.J. at 94-95, 389 A.2d at 947.
102. 115 So. 2d 697 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1959).
103. Id. at 700.
104. Id. at 699-701.
105. 77 N.J. at 106-07, 389 A.2d at 953. Courts have confronted situations similar to
Resnick, involving the use of public facilities other than schools for religious purposes. In Allen v.
Morton, 495 F.2d 65 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the court enjoined extensive government participation In a
Christmas pageant held on national park grounds, but permitted the use of the park for the
pageant. In Pratt v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 110 Ariz. 466, 520 P.2d 514 (1974), the court upheld
the use of a state-owned football stadium for religious services as long as no sectarian preference
was shown and no government funds were expended for religious worship.
106. 77 N.J. at 135, 389 A.2d at 967 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 107, 389 A.2d at 953.
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architects and that one had applied to the township's planning board for
approval of its building site.'0 8 A factual approach, such as the majority's,
should enable a court to determine whether the group's use of the facilities
should be viewed as permanent or temporary.
The Resnick court also held that the rental program did not create excessive
administrative entanglement. The court found that the rental program did not
involve intrusive surveillance of the religious organizations and was
sufficiently self-policing so that it did not create the appearance of sponsor-
ship. 10 9 In addition, the court stated that the storage of religious artifacts in
the public school was permissible as long as it did not interfere with public
education. 110 In essence, the court held that the board of education's passive
involvement with religious organizations was distinguishable from the more
active relationship inherent in state subsidy and direct grant programs. I I ' The
Resnick court also held that, because the program did not require large
appropriations of public funds for its continued operation, the potential for
political entanglement was slight. The court reasoned that the rental program
would not encourage participating religious groups to exert political pressure
upon their local government officials.' 12
Applying the certainty requirement imposed by Meek and Lemon, Justice
Clifford found that the program possessed the potential for excessive entan-
glement and, therefore, was invalid. Justice Clifford reasoned that the opera-
tion of the rental program required a significant amount of recordkeeping and
frequent communication between the board of education and the religious
participants. 1 1 3 He found that such a working relationship continued over a
long period of time would produce excessive administrative entanglement.
Justice Clifford also argued that the 5rogram created the potential for political
entanglement because the demand for space in the public school may exceed
the supply, and the religious groups may attempt to influence government
officials to help them obtain a place in the program." 4
The majority's interpretation of the excessive entanglement portion of the
three-part test represents a departure from the trend developed in recent
United States Supreme Court decisions. The Court, having affixed a standard
of certainty to the excessive entanglement portion of the three-part test, has
demonstrated a willingness to find entanglement inherent in the nature of the
program and the character of the recipients, regardless of a showing of no
actual entanglement. The majority in Resnick, however, based its holding on
the absence of actual entanglement, without requiring the parties defending
the program to establish the lack of potential entanglement. It is submitted
108. Id. at 94-95, 389 A.2d at 947.
109. Id. at 116, 389 A.2d at 958. Given the seriousness of the entanglement issue, the court
appears to have dismissed the potential for entanglement in a summary manner. See id. at 133,
389 A.2d at 966 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 117, 389 A.2d at 958. This finding can be contrasted with the trial court's holding
that such storage created excessive entanglement with religion because it identified the govern-
ment with the inculcation of religious values. 135 N.J. Super. at 268, 343 A.2d at 133.
111. 77 N.J. at 115, 389 A.2d at 957.
112. Id. at 116, 389 A.2d at 958.
113. Id. at 133, 389 A.2d at 966 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 134, 389 A.2d at 967 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
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that in cases such as Resnick, which do not involve programs calling for large
appropriations or active involvement in the internal affairs of religious
organizations, the determination of excessive entanglement should be based
upon proof of actual rather than potential entanglement.
In Resnick, the New Jersey Supreme Court interpreted the requirements of
the establishment clause in a manner which accommodated the interests of the
religious organizations. The Resnick court's interpretation of the three-part
test is preferable to the strict application demonstrated by the United States
Supreme Court. Although it is the duty of the courts to guard against the evils
proscribed by the establishment clause, the Constitution does not mandate
hostility toward religion.
Thomas W. Izzard
